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Abstract. This article analyses the way of the French Constitutional Council, starting with its famous Association 
decision in 1971, transformed a brief reference to historical declarations of rights in the thin Preamble of the 
current French constitution (adopted in 1958) into a wide-ranging judge-made catalogue of fundamental rights. 
This, combined with two important reforms of the procedure for submissions of statutes to the Constitutional 
Council for review (in 1974 and 2008), are gradually establishing the Constitutional Council as an important actor 
in the legislative process and a central body for the protection of human rights in France. The article also brieﬂ y 
explores the scope and limits of this protection. It then discusses recent proposals for amending the Preamble. It 
analyses the only amendment so far, namely the inclusion of a reference to the Charter for the Environment, 
which aimed at providing a constitutional basis for the protection of environment, as well as other controversial 
suggestions, such as those aiming at enabling positive discrimination measures towards minorities, the guarantee 
of media pluralism, the protection of privacy and personal data and the respect of human dignity. It concludes on 
the use and misuses of comparative law for constitutional reforms. 
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1.  Introductory remarks: the 1958 “Political” Constitution, 
its “Amputated” Constitutional Judge and its “Insigniﬁ cant” Preamble 
As is well-known, France has had a tormented constitutional history, going through many 
different political regimes, and no less than ﬁ fteen constitutions since the French Revolution 
in 1789. This is to say that 
the French should know about constitutions! One can differ as to whether the history 
of France should be considered a fruitful garden of constitutional thought, a graveyard 
of constitutional experiments, a “musée des constitutions”, or a mineﬁ eld; in any 
case it is beyond doubt that the French are rather experienced in constitutions and 
constitutional changes.1
The current constitution, which provides for the basic rules for France’s Fifth Republic, 
was adopted in 1958. It is the longest lasting French constitution after the constitutional 
laws of the Third Republic (1875). It has been amended twenty-four times. 
As to the signiﬁ cance of the Constitution in French political life, it is important to 
recall that prior to 1958, the system was centered on the loi which was, in the words of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the expression of the “volonté générale” (general will).2 As such, it 
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was sovereign and should not be subject to judicial control. This reluctance to submit 
statutes to any kind of judicial oversight was also reminiscent of the long-standing distrust 
of the French political class and society towards judges, dating back to the Ancien Régime, 
where judges (parlements) had been mostly concerned about maintaining privileges. 
Consequently, the Constitution was essentially a symbolic document, and was endowed 
with no serious enforcement mechanism. The 1946 Constitution (Art. 91) did provide for a 
Comité Constitutionnel to check whether the adoption of legislation required the revision of 
the Constitution. The procedure was nonetheless difﬁ cult to engage and remained unused. 
The 1958 Constituant deviated slightly from this tradition, by setting up a body, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel, whose task was to check the conformity of legislative proposals 
and bills with the Constitution. This control was nonetheless minimalist; it provided only 
for concentrated, abstract and a priori constitutional review. Once in force, a statute could 
no longer be contested, even where it had not been subject to prior “constitutional clearance” 
or where its incompatibility with constitutional rules only unfolded through its application. 
Moreover, the control was political.3 First, it was essentially aimed at limiting parliamentary 
inﬂ uence over executive affairs and at preventing governmental instability of the kind which 
destabilised the Third and Fourth Republics.4 Basically, the Constitutional Council was 
meant to be the “guard dog of the executive”.5 Second, only a restricted number of political 
personalities could refer legislation to the Constitutionnal Council for review. These were 
the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister or the President of one of the two 
parliamentary chambers (Assemblée Nationale and Sénat). Where all belong to the some 
political party, the likelihood of referral would be almost non-existent. Third, the membership 
of the Conseil Constitutionnel was political too, with no legal competences required from 
its members, and a nomination process controled by political personalities (three members 
nominated by the President of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly 
3 Stone, A.: The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford, 1992.
4 It was part of a general attempt to “rationalise” parliamentarism. Art. 34 of the Constitution 
ﬁ xed the domain of intervention of the legislator; the rest was taken as falling under the competence 
of the executive (Art. 37 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Council was essentially set up to 
make sure that the Parliament remained within the limits set by the Constitution and did no endeavor 
to “govern”, as it did in the previous regimes. The Council did not have the competence to review acts 
of the governments which interfered with legislative power. It was thus a one-way street, although the 
Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative court, could check that decrees and regulations complied 
with laws and did not interfere with legislative competences. There were two ways to involve the 
Council in the control of legislation. The Council could be seized during legislative discussions by the 
Prime Minister (Art. 41 of the Constitution, not much used) where some provisions of envisaged 
legislation did not belong to the legislative ﬁ eld of competence. Since 2008, the President of each 
chamber can also raise such issue (Constitutional law No 2008-624 DC on the Modernisation of the 
Institutions of the Fifth Republic). A second situation calling for referral concerns legislative projects, 
which contain provisions related to the regulatory ﬁ eld (Art. 37.2 of the Constitution). The main mode 
of referral of proposed legislation to the Constitutional Council is provided by Art. 61 of the 
Constitution, and takes place after the law has been adopted in parliament, but before it comes into 
force, and may concern any provision of the Constitution. 
5 Vie Publique (2010) “Les Origines du Conseil Constitutionnel”, available at http://www.vie-
publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/origines-du-conseil-
constitutionnel.html
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and three by the President of the Senate), and former Presidents of the Republic were ex 
ofﬁ cio life members.6 
Let us now turn to the aspect of this Constitution which concerns us here: its preamble. 
The preambles of past French constitutions not only offered an exposition of the motives or 
“proclamation” (1814, 1815, or 1852); the vast majority of them also included fully ﬂ edged 
bills of rights (1791, 1793, 1795, 1848, and 1946).7 Indeed, traditionally, French constituants 
did not provide for self-standing Charters of Rights; neither did they integrate Bills of 
Rights into the core of the Constitution. The French custom was to place the Declaration of 
Rights in the preamble. This positioning seemed to indicate that these Declarations of 
Rights were meant to have purely symbolic value; something which in any case was not 
such a big deal, since the Constitution itself, for lack of constitutional review system, also 
remained purely aspirational. 
At ﬁ rst sight, the 1958 Preamble, does not impress. Nothing like the “We the People of 
the United States…” which opens the American Constitution. It only consists of two 
sentences.8 The last sentence oddly refers to the right to self-determination of overseas 
peoples, whilst the ﬁ rst sentence brieﬂ y states that “the French people solemnly proclaim 
their attachement to the rights of the Man and principles of national sovereignty as deﬁ ned 
in the Declaration of 1789, conﬁ rmed and complemented by the Preamble of the Constitution 
of 1946”.9 However, although in formal terms it stops there, most commentators would 
agree that, in substantive terms, the Preamble also encompasses what is now Art. 1,10 which 
provides that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic; ...
ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or 
religion, [and]...respect all beliefs.” The rest of the Constitution, at least in its original 
conﬁ guration, dealt with the various organs of the state and their relationships. Thus, the 
only mention of fundamental human rights in the French 1958 constitutional settlement was 
in the Preamble, which bearing in mind constitutional tradition, did not augure well for the 
the protection of such rights. However, the apparent modesty of the 1958 Preamble will 
turn out to be its greatest strength, as it offered a discrete, yet potentially limitless, short-cut 
to human rights resources. 
2.  The 1971 Freedom of Association Decision, the Rights Revolution 
and the Russian Dolls Preamble
From 1958 until the 1970s, France’s Constitution was a “Separation of Power–Constitution” 
but not a “Charter of Rights and Liberties–Constitution”11 or, to use the typology developped 
6 Art. 56 of the Constitution. 
7 Only the rapidly adopted constitutional laws of 1875, which founded the Third Republic, had 
no preamble. Note, in passing, that it did not prevent it from lasting 70 years...!
8 It is one of the shortest Preambles in the world of constitutions. Orgad, L.: The Preamble in 
Constitutional Interpretation. International Journal of Constitutional Law, I-CON (forthcoming), 
8 (2010) 5, footnote 15.
9 Since the constitutional revision of 2005 (Constitutional Law No 2005–205 of 1 March 2005 
relating to the Charter for the Environment), it also makes reference to the rights and duties as deﬁ ned 
in the Charter for the Environment of 2004.
10 Part of what is now Art. 1 used to be Art. 2, until the Constitutional Law No 95-880 of 
4 August 1995.
11 Veil, S.: Redécouvrir le Préambule de la Constitution–Rapport du comité présidé par Simone 
Veil. La Documentation Française. 2008, 7.
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by Dean Maurice Hauriou, France was endowed with a political constitution, but no 
apparent social constitution (save for a frail embryo in the 1958 Constitution Preamble). 
The “rights’ revolution”12 took place in 1971, when the Constitutional Council turned 
the “insigniﬁ cant” 1958 Preamble into Russian dolls, revealing almost limiteless 
constitutional resources. 
Perhaps because they had introduced some kind of constitutional control, the drafters 
of the 1946 Constitution had explicitly forbidden the weak ancestor of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel, the Comité Constitutionnel, from assessing the compatibility of laws with 
the Constitution’s ambitious and progressive Preamble.13 However, as the 1958 Preamble 
was so “low-key”, the drafters of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution probably thought it 
unnecessary to take similar precaution and did not make any explicit provision as to its 
legal value, or rather lack thereof. The Conseil Constitutionnel thus did not face formal 
constitutional obstacle to upgrading the Preamble into a constitutional norm. However, that 
would mean ﬂ exing its muscles, as constitutional traditions in France and abroad suggested 
tha constitutional preambles were meant to be essentially for symbolic, or at beast, 
interpretative purposes, and not to serve a independent sources of rights.14 It would also 
have to deploy a fair amount of legal ingenuity to transform the ugly little duck-preamble 
into a beautiful swam. The Freedom of Association case provided the right opportunity for 
such delicate operation.15
In the follow-up to May 1968, the Interior Minister started a policy of limitations of 
individual freedoms (right to demonstrate, right to free movement, the freedom of the press, 
the freedom of assembly, and eventually freedom of association). Based on a ministerial 
instruction, a prefect (a representative of the state at local level) refused to the founding 
members of the “Association des Amis de la Cause du Peuple”, the receipt for the 
declaration of this association, without which it could not operate. The administrative court 
annuled the prefect’s refusal. The Minister, who realised that its position was in breach of 
the law, simply decided to have the law changed. In June 1971, the National Assembly 
adopted, despite the opposition of the Senate, a legislative proposal which enabled a prefect 
to delay his/her issuance of an authorisation until judicial authorities had reviewed the 
lawfulness of an association. The President of the Senate referred the law to the 
Constitutional Council. 
The judges of the Rue de Montpensier16  engaged into what I like to call Russian Dolls 
reasoning. First, the Constitutional Council declared that the 1958 Preamble was an integral 
part of the Constitution. In doing to, it integrated the Preamble into the “bloc de 
constitutionnalité”, that is the collection of constitutional norms against which statutes can 
12 This expression is also used in the French context by Lasser (2009); however, he uses it in 
relation to the way the “contrôle de conventionalité”, whereby national courts checked the 
compatibility of national legislation with international agreements, especially the European Convention 
on Human Rights, enabled national courts to limit legislative infringements of human rights, in a 
manner which was not allowed by constitutional review (at least until the 2008 reform). 
13 Art. 92 of the 1946 Constitution.
14 Orgad: op. cit.
15 Decision No 71-44-DC Freedom of Association of 16 July 1971.
16 Address of the Constitutional Council.
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be reviewed (analogy with the “bloc de légalité”).17 Second, the Constitutional Council 
explained that the 1958 Preamble proclaimed the “attachement” of the French people to 
human rights as expressed in the 1789 Declaration, and conﬁ rmed in the 1946 Preamble. 
From these, it concluded that these two documents also had constitutional value. In doing 
so, it basically granted the 1946 Preamble a status which the 1946 Constituant had refused 
it.18 Third, it noted that the 1946 Preamble itself referred to the fundamental principles 
recognised in the laws of the Republic. Since the famous “Loi 1901” (an ordinary law), 
which was such a “republican” law, had granted protection to the freedom of association, 
such freedom therefore should also have constitutional status.
To sum up, by granting constitutional value to the 1958 Preamble, the Constitutional 
Council also gave the texts to which the 1958 Preamble made reference, namely the 1789 
Declaration and the 1946 Preamble, similar superior status. By the same token, it conferred 
on all the rights and principles to which these two constitutional documents referred, or 
which could be derived from them, the nature of supreme law. The Preamble thus operated 
like Russian dolls, with new constitutional rules and principles to be derived from past 
constitutional documents, themselves found in the current Preamble. 
3.  Moving towards comprehensive constitutional review: 
the 1974 and 2008 revisions 
The Freedom of Association decision was welcome in legal circles and by the public alike. 
It became such a “popular” issue, that V. Giscard d’Estaing, during his presidential 
campaign, made the promise that he would extent the right to refer laws to the Constitutional 
Council to a wider range of personalities. When he became President of the Republic in 
1974, he obtained a revision of the Constitution which granted the right to submit proposed 
legislation to the Council to sixty deputees and senators.19 This reform marked a second 
turning point for the protection of fundamental rights through constitutional review in 
France. 
This reform basically enabled the parliamentary Opposition to use constitutional 
review systematically to obtain the partial or full invalidation of bills, or threatening to use 
it, to secure amendments in planned legislation. The new perspective of negotiating in the 
shadow of constitutional review thus changed the legislative game. It also enabled the 
Constitutional Council to play a greater role in the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedom, and to ﬂ esh up the Constitution, and more particularly, its Preamble, at least in 
abstracto. 
The reform nonetheless maintained the French constitutional review system within a 
pure Kelsenian tradition, focused on a procedural and theoretical aspects. Further expension 
of the right to apply to the Constitutional Council where thus halted for quite a while, 
although academics and politicians regularly called for a more comprehensive review 
system, to enable constitutional compatibility checks after a statute had come into force (for 
17 In fact, this decision was only the logical result of a less-known decision adopted in the 
previous year, which had already established the legal value of the preamble, although in relation to 
the conformity of a treaty (and not a statute) to the Constitution (Decision  No 70-39 DC European 
Community Budget of 19 June 1970).
18 Orgad: op. cit. 13.
19 Constitutional Law No 74-904 of 29 October 1974 on the revision of Art. 61 of the 
Constitution.
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example, 1990 Badinter proposal, 1993 Vedel Committee report). These nonetheless 
remained lettre morte, due to the Senate’s opposition. The idea eventually returned on the 
political agenda, when President Sarkozy, in its Epinal speech of 12 July 2007, raised the 
question, and entrusted a Committee of Reﬂ ection on modernisation of the institutions of 
the Fifth Republic, chaired by Edouard balladur, to examine possible reforms. The work of 
the Committee led to the important 2008 constitutional revision, which amended many 
constitutional rules.20 For our purpose, we should mention that the amendments created a 
new institution, the Defensor of Rights, a sort of Ombudman, whose task will be to make 
sure that administrations and public bodies respect citizens’ rights (New Title XIA). The 
constitutional revision also introduced a long-awaited a posteriori and concrete constitutional 
control mechanism, by means of exception, through the Priority Preliminary Ruling on the 
Issue of Constitutionality (in French, Question Prioritaire de Constitutionalité or QPC). 
This reform should enable the Preamble to develop its full social potential and the 
Constitutional Council to ﬁ nally become a real guardian of fundamental rights and liberties. 
Indeed, the new Art. 61-1 of the Constitution provides that “if, during proceedings in 
progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a statutory provision infringes the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil 
d’État or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council, within a determined 
period.” The organic law, which determines the conditions of application of the new 
mechanism, speciﬁ es that the question must be relevant to the dispute and serious, and that 
the legislative provision should not have been already declared as complying with the 
Constitution by the Constitutional Council.21 
What this new constitutional review mechanism will actually bring remains to be seen. 
Some believe it comes too late to transfor the Constitutional Council as the choice defensor 
of human rights, for such role has already been taken up, for quite a while, by the European 
Court of Human Rights,22 or even the European Court for Justice.23 But one can also be 
more optimistic. The road to Strasbourg is a long one, and the QPC, if the Cour de Cassation 
and the Conseil d’Etat play the game, and refer all questions which fulﬁ ll the conditions, 
offers a short-cut to Paris.24 If the judges take care of at least aligning their standards of 
protection with the Strasbourg judges, any rational being would opt for the QPC. Truly 
20 Constitutional law No 2008-624 DC on the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth 
Republic.
21 Organic law No 2009-1523 du 10 December 2009 related to the application of Art. 61-1 of 
the Constitution. 
22 Chantebout, B.: Droit Constitutionnel. Paris, 2009, 578; M. de Lasser, S. O.: Judicial 
Transformations: the Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe. Oxford, 2009.
23 In that regard, it is interesting to note that the Cour de Cassation recently sent a reference for 
a preliminary ruling challenging the compatibility of the QPC with the principle of supremacy of EU 
law; however, the ECJ considered it compatible with EU law, taking into account the Conseil d’Etat 
and Conseil Constitutionnel’s explanations of the operation of the procedure, as not interfering with 
courts’ ability to interpret national law in conformity with EU law and to set aside national measures 
incompatible with EU law. C-188/10 and C-189/10 Aziz Melki and Selim Abdeli [2010], nyr. 
24 Recently, the Conseil D’Etat refused to refer a QPC concerning the constitutionality of 
measures relating to the dissolution of sport associations to the Constitutional Council, arguing that 
the question was not new and serious. The parties are planning to take the case to the European Court 
of Human Rights. CE, 2ème et 7ème SSR, 8 October 2010, Groupement de fait Brigade Sud de Nice 
et M. Zamalo (No 340849). 
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enough, it is problematic that legislative provisions which have already been given a priori 
abstract clearance cannot be challenged through the QPC, even if their application revealed 
unforeseeable constitutional ﬂ aws; these renders many of the legislative provisions adopted 
since 1974 “untouchables”. Yet, the reform should still help to clear up the French legal 
order from legislative provisions which, either for lack of jurisdiction, negligence, or 
political calculation, have remain “unchecked”. 
The procedure was used for the ﬁ rst time in May 2010. After ﬁ ve months of actual 
operation, the pace of examination of legislative provisions by the Council under the QPC 
is accelerating, with around twenty decisions per month over the last two months. This 
should be contrasted with the one or two decisions a month delivered under the previous 
system. More signiﬁ cantly, from all the provisions referred under the QPCs, the Council 
found that one-third were in either a total or partial violation of the Constitution, or that 
they were only compatible if interpreted and applied  according to its instructions.25 Finally, 
and unsurprisingly, QPCs basically concern the compatibility of statutes with rights and 
principles protected on the basis of the Preamble. With that in mind, the new review 
procedure should contribute to the Preamble establishing itself as the central pillar of 
constitutional review in France. 
4.  The “rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution”: 
a “judge-made” catalogue based on the France’s constitutional tradition 
Let us now turn to the question of which rights and liberties are hidding in our Russian 
Dolls Preamble, which contain constitutional texts drafted over a range of more than two 
hundred years, for different regimes, with different, and perhaps even conﬂ icting, ideologies 
in mind? How do these ﬁ t, and interact, with one another to build a protective web for 
peoples’ rights. 
The information page of the Conseil Constitutionnel speciﬁ es that “the rights and 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution” which statutes must respect are the ones mentionned 
in the 1958 Constitution (as amended), the text to which the 1958 Constitution refers, 
namely the 1789 Declaration, the 1946 Preamble, the fundamental principles recognised by 
the laws of the Republic (referred to in the 1946 Preamble) and, since 2005, the Charter for 
the Environment. However, in reality, there is more than that, since from these sources, the 
Constitutional Council derived a number of further constitutional principles and 
objectives.26
The 1789 Declaration of Rights was strongly inspired by the Enlightment philosophy. 
Drafted by the Marquis de Lafayette, it was destined to become the basis for a constitution 
for France. It was based on the notion of natural rights, the concept of social contract (Locke 
and Rousseau) and Montesquieu’s theory of separation of powers. It is thus a text with a 
strong liberal and individualist orientation, focused on what we now refer to as “ﬁ rst 
25 Over the ﬁ fty or so decisions made so far under the QPC, about 20% found a total or partial 
non-conformity (about half with temporal limitations of their effects), and another 10% of the 
decisions declared compatibility with reserve of interpretation.
26 “Qu’entend-on par ‘droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit’?”, under Question Prioritaire 
de Constitutionnalité, at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/ 
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generation” rights.27 It recognises civil rights, or the “rights of a man as a person”,28 such as 
the principles of equality (Art. 1), liberty (Arts 1 and 4), including the right to safety and 
civil resistance (Art. 2), legality and legal certainty (Arts 7–8), the presumption of innocence 
(Art. 8), the freedom of opinions and thoughts (Art. 10), the freedom of expression (Art. 
11), and the right to property (Arts 2 and 17). It also recognises political rights, or the 
“rights of the man in relation to the Nation”, such as the right to participate directly or 
indirectly in the elaboration of the law (Art. 6), equal access to public positions (Art. 6), the 
unity of national sovereignty (Art. 3), the principle of agreement to taxation and its equal 
sharing (Art. 14), the existence of force publique (Art. 12), the control and accountability of 
the administration (Art. 15), and legal guarantees (Art. 16). 
The Declaration has been a wonderful source of inspiration for the recognition and 
protection of civil and political rights, since the Constitutional Council has granted 
constitutional value to every rights it contains.29 However, its anachronism sometimes poses 
problematic restrictions on constitutional jurisprudence. Notably, the formal equality notion 
on which it is based prevents positive discrimination measures in France.30 The only way 
out is to amend the Constitution itself, to provide for a “concurrent” constitutional basis for 
afﬁ rmative action. Art. 1 of the Constitution was thus amended on in 1999, to include that 
“statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective ofﬁ ces and posts”.31 It 
served as a basis to the 2000 statute on equal access of women and men to electoral mandate 
and elective functions,32 which the Council eventually validated.33 However, the narrow 
focus of the constitutional amendment excluded positive measures beyond the political 
world. In 2008, the Constitution was thus amended again to enable legislative promotion of 
equal access between men and women to “positions of professional and social responsibility” 
(new Art. 1).34 Yet, to the extent that the successive constitutional amendments only focus 
on sex discrimination in certain ﬁ elds, the formal equality principle of the Declaration still 
blocks the way to other types of positive discrimination measures, towards ethnic minorities 
for example. It is seen as effectively blocking the way to any “communautarist” legislation. 
Art. 1 also prohibits statistical information on ethnicity or race, despite the strong support 
27 Note in passing that it only granted rights to men and male citizens, and not to women 
(despite Condorcet’s support to the inclusion of women). It prompted Olympe de Gouges to publish a 
concurrent Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen in September 1791. Women 
equal rights were eventually recognized in the 1946 Constitution. The principle also did not apply to 
slaves.
28 Veil: op. cit. 21.
29 The ﬁ rst time that a statute was checked against a provision of the Declaration was in the 
Conseil Constitutionnel Decision 73-51 DC Finance Law of 27 December 1973, concerning the 
principle of equality.
30 For example, Decision No 82–146 Local Elections of 18 November 1982, conﬁ rmed by 
a decision No 98-407 Regional Elections of 14 January 1999.
31 Constitutional law No 99-569 of 8 July 1999 relating to the equality between women 
and men. 
32 Law No 2000-493 of 6 June 2000 to favor the equal access of women and men to electoral 
mandate and elective functions. 
33 Decision No 2000-429 DC Equal access of women and men to electoral mandate and elective 
functions.
34 Constitutional law No 2008-624 DC on the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth 
Republic.
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from the academic and scientiﬁ c community for such data, as many consider them as 
essential in the ﬁ ght against discrimination.35
The Preamble of 1946, for its part, is “a legal discourse of political facture”,36 which 
aims a fairer society.37 In addition to adhering to the French liberal constitutional tradition 
through a reference to the 1789 Declaration and the “fundamental principles recognised by 
the laws of the Republic”, the 1946 Preamble adds its own list of political, social and 
economic principles “particularly necessary to our times”,  such as equal rights for men and 
women (para 3), the right to protection of health, material security, rest and leisure of 
mothers, children and older workers (para 11), the right of the family to the conditions of 
development (para 10), the right for anyone unable to work to have suitable means of 
existence (para 11), and the right to asylum for persecuted persons (para 4). It also includes 
workers rights, such as the right to work and have a job (para 5), the right to defend ones 
interests through trade union membership and action (para 6), the right to strike (para 7), 
and the right to the determination of working conditions and participation in the management 
of companies (para 8). Finally, it added the right to education, vocational training and 
culture through a laic and free education system (para 13), solidarity and equality in the 
face of national catastrophies (para 12), and a few principles related to international relations 
(paras 14–18). The Constitutional Council’s ﬁ rst reference to such principles necessary to 
our times was in its famous Abortion decision of 1975,38 which established the right to 
health.
So much for the rights and principles explicitly mentionned in this bundle of 
constitutional texts. These are, in any case, only the visible tip of the iceberg, as the 
constitutional judge also nees to identify what lies behind the cryptic, and apparently open-
ended, formula of the “fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic”, to 
which the 1946 Preamble refer without further ado.39 The Conseil d’Etat had already started 
such process by recognising, as early as 1956, the freedom of association as such principle.40 
The Constitutional Council followed up and recognised a number of such principles, such 
as the freedom of association (identiﬁ ed in the groundbreaking decision of 1971), the rights 
of the defense or “due process” (1976),41 individual freedoms (1977),42 the freedom of 
education (1977),43 including the freedom of higher education44 (1999), the freedom of 
35 Decision No 2007-557 DC  Immigration management of 15 November 2007. Veil: op. cit. 60.
36 Koubi, G.: Le Préambule de la Constitution de 1946. Antinomies juridiques et contradictions 
politiques. PUF, 1996. 9.
37 Conac, G.: Le Préambule de la Constituion de 1946. Une Genèse difﬁ cile, un itineraire 
imprévu. In: Conac, G.–Prétrot, X.–Teboul, G. (eds): Le Preambule de la Constitution de 1946. 
histoire, analyse et commentaires. Paris, 2001, 4.
38 Decision No 74-54 DC Abortion of 15 January 1975.
39 Simone Veil submits that it proceeded of the desire of the 1946 Constituant to link the 
Constitution back to the political liberalism of the Third Republic, and deﬁ nitely end with the Vichy 
regime. Veil: op. cit. 23.
40 CE, Amicales des annamites de Paris’, 11 July 1956, Rec 317.
41 Decision No 76-70 DC Prevention of occupational accidents of 2 December 1976.
42 Decision No 76-75 DC of Vehicle Search of 12 January 1977.
43 Decision No 77-87 DC Freedom of education and conscience of 23 November 1977.
44 Decision No 99-414 DC Agricultural Orientation of 8 July 1999.
10 MARIE-PIERRE GRANGER
thoughts (1977),45 the independence of administrative justice (1980),46 the independence of 
University professors (1984),47 the judicial review competence of administrative courts 
(1987),48 the notion of judicial courts as guardians of private real estate (1989),49 and the 
educative nature of criminal sanctions for minors (2002).50 The Conseil d’Etat added to that 
list the duty of the state to refuse extradition when it is asked for political motives (1996)51 
and the principle of “laicité” (2001).52 These, by and large, correspond to values which are 
recognised in most European constitutional systems. However, aware of the potentially 
limitless nature of the notion and risk of arbitrariness, the Constitutional Council rapidly 
put some limits to this category of constitutional norms, by considering that only really 
fundamental principles, stating a sufﬁ ciently important rule, in a sufﬁ cienly general manner 
and concerning essential ﬁ elds for the life of a nation, such as fundamental liberties, national 
sovereignty or the organization of public powers, could be granted constitutional value. In 
addition, it explained that they must be found in,  and never have been derogated from, laws 
adopted under a republican regime prior to 1946. 
In addition to these principles “based” on republican laws, the Conseil Constitutionnel 
also endeavoured to ﬂ esh up the Constitution and its Preamble, by recognising “principles” 
and “objectives” of “constitutional value”, which are not explicitly referred to in the 
constitutional texts, but can be deduced from them. The Constitutional Council recognised 
for the ﬁ rst time an objective as having constitutional value in the famous Decision on the 
Audiovisual Law, which established the objective of pluralism of the press and media  of 
objective of constitution.53 These objectives can serve to place limits of individual rigths 
which are constitutionally protected. But let us detail a little how these principles and 
objectives are discovered by the constitutional judge.
For example, from Art. 6 of the 1789 Declaration, the Constitutional Council drew a 
principle of equality before justice. Based on this, it considered that the legislator could not 
impose more than one penalty for the same offence,54 could not refuse to legal persons a 
right of response which natural persons have,55 or could not prevent victims of strike from 
introducing law suits to obtain compensation.56 From Art. 11 of the 1789 Declaration on the 
freedom of communication, it derives a right to information, and from that, the objective of 
pluralism of the press and media,57 or the right of access to the Internet as a fundamental 
freedom.58 From the principle of individual freedom provided by Art. 2 of the Declaration 
45 Decision No 77-87 DC Freedom of education and conscience of 23 November 1977.
46 Decision No 80-119 DC Validation of Administrative Act of 22 July 1980.
47 Decision No 83-165 DC University freedoms of 20 July 1984; Decision No 2010-20/21 QPC 
University of 6 August 2010.
48 Decision No 86-224 DC Competition Council of 23 January 1987.
49 Decision No 89-256 DC Urbanism and new towns of 25 July 1989.
50 Decision No 2002-461 DC Justice Law of 29 August 2002. 
51 Conseil d’Etat, Decision of 3 July 1996, Ass., Koné, Rec. 255.
52 CE, SNES, 6 April 2001. 
53 Decision No 82-141 DC Audiovisual Communication of 27 July 1982.
54 Decision No 75-56 DC Penal Law of 23 July 1975.
55 Decision No 82-141 DC Audiovisual Communication of 27 July 1982.
56 Decision No 82-144 DC Staff Representation of 22 October 1982.
57 Decision No 84-181 DC Concentration, Financial Transparency and Pluralism of Press 
Undertakings of 11 October 1984.
58 Decision No 2009-580 DC HADOPI of 10 June 2009.
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or Art. 66 of the Constitution, it constructs not only the right to come and go, but also the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, the inviolability of the home, the right to private life,59 in 
particular regarding the protection of personal data,60 the right to marry, the right to have a 
normal family life, and the right to family reunion for foreigners.61 Probably the most far-
stretched “discovery” is that of the principle of protection of human dignity, which the 
Council derived from the ﬁ rst sentence of the 1946 Preamble, providing that “all human 
being without distinction of race, religion or beliefs, possess ineliable and sacred rights”.62 
Other principles having constitutional value are the continuity of public services,63 the 
freedom to carry out a business (liberté d’entreprendre),64 or contractual freedom.65 As for 
the “objectives of constitutional value”, these cover the safeguard of public order, the 
respect of others’ freedom, the preservation of the pluralist character of means of socio-
cultural expressions,66 the pluralism of beliefs and opinions,67 the protection of public 
health,68 the prevention of public order offences, in particular threat on the security of 
persons and goods, and the search for those commiting offences,69 the possibility for 
everyone to have a decent accomodation,70 the accessibility and clarity of the law,71 the 
ﬁ ght against tax fraud and evasion,72 and the ﬁ nancial balance of social security.73 
Next to the list of recognition, we should also add the list of rejections, that is the 
principles to which the Council refused to give constitutional value. These are the principle 
of legitimate expectations,74 the transparency of public activities,75 the equity between 
generations,76 the criminal irresponsability of minors,77  the “principe de faveur” in labor 
59 Decision No 76-75 DC Vehicle Searches of 12 January 1977, No 94-352 DC Security Law of 
18 January 1995, No 99-416 DC Universal health Cover Law of 23 July 1999, No 2003-467 DC 
Internal Security Law of 13 March 2003; No 2010-25 QPC Internal Security Law of 16 September 
2010.
60 Decision No 2004-499 DC Treatment of Personal Data of 29 July 2004.
61 Decision No 93-325 DC Immigration of 13 August 1993.
62 Decisions No 94-343/344 DC Organ donation of 27 July 1994;  No 2010-25 QPC “Internal 
Security Law” of 16 September 2010.
63 Decision No 79-105 DC “Continuity of Public Service of radio and Television” of 25 July 
1979
64 Decisions No 81-132 Nationalisation Law of 16 January 1982 and No 92-316 Corruption and 
Transparency Law’ of 20 January 1993.
65 Decisions No 81-132 Nationalisation Law of 16 January 1982. 
66 Decision No 82-141 DC Audiovisual Communication of 27 July 1982.
67 Decision No 2004-497 DC Electronic and Audiovisual Communication Law of 1 July 2004.
68 Decision No 90-283 DC Fight against Tobacco Dependence and Alcoholism Law of 
8 January 1991.
69 Decision No 94-352 DC National Security of 18 January 1995.
70 Decision No 94-359 DC Accommodation Diversity Law of 19 January 1995.
71 Decision No 99-421 DC Codiﬁ cations of 16 December 1999.
72 Decisions No 99-424 DC Finance Law of 29 December 1999; 2010-19/27 QPC Modernisation 
of the Economy Law of 30 July 2010.
73 Decision No 2002-463 DC Social Security Financing of 12 December 2002.
74 Decision No 97-391 DC Urgent ﬁ scal and ﬁ nancial measures of 7 November 1997.
75 Decision No 93-335 DC Urbanism and construction of 21 January 1994.
76 Decision No 97-388 DC Pension saving fund (PEP) of 20 March 1997.
77 Decision No 2002-461 DC Justice Law of 23 August 2002.
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law78 or recently the prohibition, exception and exclusivity related to gambling and 
betting.79 
And of course, one should also bear in mind the rules and principles which the Conseil 
uses to determine the degree of control which it applies (for example, proportionality, the 
sanction of only manifest errors).80 
It is important to point out that there is no hierarchy within this “bloc de 
constitutionalité”, based on the origin of the norm, or its form. In French constitutional law, 
unlike in Germany, no norm have supra-constitutional value and are inalienable. A 2003 
decision of the Constitutional Council conﬁ rmed it, when it declined having competence to 
assess the compatibility with the Constitution of laws amending it.81 In case of contradiction, 
the rights and principles “must be conciliated, and they do no exclude eachother; thus, a 
‘recognised fundamental principle’ like that of the ‘continuity of the public service’ justiﬁ es 
some restrictions to the right to strike, expressly proclaimed by the Preamble of 1946.”82 
Also, as noted before in relation to the principle of equality, since the constitutional value of 
the 1789 Declaration and the 1946 Preamble is based on the 1958 Constitution, amendments 
to the Constitution can “go against” them. In France, the Preamble, although an independent 
source of rights, thus still does not go as far as “walking before the Constitution”.83 
The creative and expensive nature of constitutional jurisprudence is not typically 
French. And modern trends also point at greater reliance on constitutional preambles not 
only as providing determinant interpretative guidance, but also as creating rights.84  Yet, the 
scope of the French Constitutional Council’s law-making has been remarkable, considering 
the frail constitutional basis, and its weak (original) institutional position. Probably its 
closest “competitor” in Europe is the European Court of Justice, which developped a 
susbtantial catalogue of fundamental rights based on no legal basis at all. 
This is for the theory. Now what does this mean in practice? Indeed, it is one thing to 
declare rights and values as constitutional, it is another one to give them a concrete 
realisation. 
5. Constitutional practice and the protection of human rights 
Some noted a certain timidity in the application of the “hard won” principles, in the 
aftermath of the 1971 “coup”. For example, the Council never invalidated any of the major 
socialist reforms of the early 1980s, mostly “amputating legislation” by sanctioning ﬂ aws 
in implementing legislation or giving interpretatative or application directions.85 However, 
during the R. Badinter’s presidency (1986–1995), the Council became more activist.86 Not 
78 Decision No 2004-494 DC Vocational Training and Social Dialogue of 29 April 2004.
79 Decision No 2010-605 DC Gambling and Betting of 12 May 2010.
80 Veil: op. cit. 24–25. 
81 Decision No 2003-469 DC Decentralisation of 26 March 2003.
82 Decision No 79-105 DC Continuity of Public Service of Radio and Television of 25 July 
1979.
83 Schmitt, C.: Constitutional Theory (Seitzer, J.–Thornhill, C. eds). Durham, 2008, 79.
84 Orgad: op. cit.
85 Although these decisions could have some important practical impact. For example, his 
decision on the nationalization law led to an increase of 30% of the compensation granted to 
shareholders of nationalized companies, and his 1984 decision “saved” the press group Hersant, which 
had been targeted by the law on the press. (Stone Sweet 1992)
86 Chantebout, B.: Droit Constitutionnel. Paris, 2009. 595.
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only did it invalidate a number of legislative provisions, it also made a greater use of 
interpretative restrictions (“declarations de conformity sous reserves”), by which it imposed 
“its” interpretation of the law on those who will apply and enforce it. It started to write 
precise decisions which left no margin of maneuver for those who had to revise the law to 
make it pass the constitutional test. At some stage, it even seemed to want to lock-in 
fundamental freedoms, such as the right to asylum or the freedom of communication,87 by 
only validating legislative provisions which reinforced them (“effet de cliquet”); however, 
this policy was not pursued.88 
In practice, the “interference” of the Constitutional Council disturbs the political class, 
which on occasions, worked to exclude it from the process (for example reform of the Code 
Pénal in 1992). Besides, it results in the government needing to resort more frequently to 
constitutional revision in order to pass legislation. We already mentionned the revisions to 
allow equal chances between men and women; there was also a reform related to the right 
to asylum in the application of the Schengen agreement. 89 In 1999, the refusal by President 
Chirac to engage a revision of the Constitution to allow the adoption of the Charter on 
regional and minority languages was strongly criticized by the socialists as being a move 
against civil liberties. It remains that, again, this constitutional revision frenzy is not a 
French phenomenon and seems to be common currency other EU countries, too.
To sum up, stone by stone, the Constitutionnal Council built on the foundations of the 
Preamble an comprehensive bills of rights. Yet, this gradual discovery of new principles, 
which may be accelerated with the new reform which will also give a more “individual 
drive” to the constitutional case law, is being criticized by some commentators as favoring 
particular interests over the public good.90 Indeed, with the QPC, the speed of construction 
is likely to accelerate, on a piece-meal basis, as disparate provisions from past statutes are 
examined by the Council. It may also be that, wary of this new “social” legitimacy, the 
Constitutional Council becomes more “sensitive” to individual human rights arguments 
which plaintiffs can now put directly to it, rather than through the mediation of members of 
the parliament. This semi-direct link with the “people” may grant the Council, and the 
courts which refer cases to him, a new autonomy, which could affect the direction of the 
case law. It is too early to tell us, but one should watch for inﬂ ections in the case law. 
It remains that the “French way”, this web of written and unwritten constitutional 
norms based on an alledgedly symbolic document, is still a bit of an oddity in the European 
constitutional tradition. Critics are plenty, who stress its lack of transparency and 
accessibility, and call for (some) codiﬁ cation. One could even point at Europe for inspiration, 
where the fundamental rigths jurisprudence of the ECJ was eventually codiﬁ ed in an EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which the Lisbon Treaty endowed with legally binding 
status. However, the French seem to be attached to their “unwritten” declaration of rights. 
In the country which put together the Code Civil more than 200 years ago, and which has 
Codes on everything, this constitutional exception looks strange. 
87 Decisions No 93-325 DC Immigration Law of 13 August 1993 and No 84-181 DC Law on 
the Concentration, Financial Transparency and Pluralism of Press Undertakings of 11 October 1984.
88 Decision No 2002-461 DC Justice Law of 23 August 2002.
89 Constitutional Law 93-1256 of 25 November 1993, relating to international agreements in the 
ﬁ eld of the right to asylum. 
90 Benoit-Rohmer, F.–Grewe, C.: Les droits sociaux ou la demolition de quelques principes. 
Strasbourg, 2003.
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6. The strange reluctance of the French constituant to “touch” at the Preamble
Various projects of amendments, or even total redrafting, of the Preamble have emanated 
from the civil society (for example project of the Nouveaux Droits de l’Homme Association, 
in the 1990s) or from the government itself. In 1975, the Edgar Faure “Commission Spéciale 
des Libertés” listed a number of constitutional principles, which could  have taken place in 
the Preamble, alongside the references to the 1946 Preamble and the 1789 Declaration; 
these were the principles of diversity, equality of chances, equality between men and 
women, dignity, right to life and physical and moral integrity, protection of privacy and 
personal data, and pluralism of the means and expression and medias. However, the Left 
refused to support the proposal. In 1993, again, a consultation committee on the revision 
of the Constitution, presided by Dean Vedel considered it desirable to grant express 
constitutional recognition to certain new rights bearing in mind the conditions of 
developments of the French society; these were the right to human dignity and private life 
(proposal 32) and the freedom and pluralism of communication (proposal 33). Finally, in 
2008, President Sarkozy set up a Committee chaired by Simone Veil, to analyse the 
Preamble, and make suggestions as to possible amendments. After a very thoughful, 
informed and detailled analysis of the current status, substance and uses of the Preamble, 
and the pros and cons of a number of speciﬁ c amendments, it eventually concluded that 
“the urgency was less in supplementing it, than in exploiting its richness through ambitious, 
concrete and active policies”.91 It therefore seems that everytime, the importance of 
maintaining the rich constitutional acquis, the ﬂ exibility and adaptation which the current 
set-up allows, and the complementarity of overlapping international, european, and national 
constitutional and legislative framework for the protection and promotion of human rights, 
plead in favor of the status quo. 
As put by one of the most eminent French constitutional scholars, Guy de Carcassone, 
“…the seventeen articles of 1789, supplemented by the 18 paragraphs of 1946, which 
themselves incorporate the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the 
Republic, constitute a Declaration of Rights and Freedoms, tainted enough by time so 
that they cannot be called into question, eternal enough so that they remain modern, 
precise enough to be protective, and vague enough to be subject to evolutions imposed 
by progress.”92
There is one single exception to the French Constituant’s reluctance touch at the 
Preamble. As France entered the New Millenium, it was felt that this sedimented 
constitutional block lacked an ecological ﬂ avour.93 President Chirac, supported by French 
TV presenter, journalist and environmental activist Nicolat Hulot, commissioned the 
Coppens Committee to put together a draft Charter for the Environment, which was adopted 
in 2004. The Charter consists of ten articles encompassing third generation rights, including 
the right of everyone to live in an environment which is balanced and respectul of his or her 
health, as well as duties imposed on individuals, public authorities and research and 
91 The Committee instructed to read their report “not as the acknowledgement of an impossibility 
to make France progress on the way to law (justice?) and equality, but as an encouragement to make 
that ‘she’ moves forward”. Veil: op. cit. 6.
92 de Carcassone, G.: La Constitution. (Traduction by the author) Essais, 6th ed., Paris, 
2004, 39.
93 Veil: op. cit. 13.
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education institutions to take part in the preservation of the environment. It also incorporated 
a carefully drafted precautionary principle. On 1 March 2005, a constitutional revision for 
the ﬁ rst time ever amended the Preamble to add a reference to the 2004 Charter for the 
Environment, thereby giving it constitutional status. 
The constitutional value of the Charter was conﬁ rmed by the Constitutional Council 
“GMO” decision, which stated, in 2008, that “all the rights and duties deﬁ ned in the Charter 
for the Environment have constitutional value”.94 However, in 2005 already, the Council 
has relied on it to invalidate important legislation,95 including the famous law on the carbon 
tax, as exemptions granted to polluting industries were declared incompatible with 
provisions of the Charter.96 First instance judicial courts have also used the Charter 
creatively, for example to order the discharge of environmental activitists who had destroyed 
GMO crops and were threatened with criminal penalties.97 First instance administrative 
courts also did not wait long to declare that the Charter had granted the right to a clean and 
healthy environment the status of “fundamental freedom of constitutional value”.98 The 
Conseil d’Etat, for its part, was rather timid at ﬁ rst, limiting the effects of the provisions of 
the Charter.99 However, in a 2008 decision, he ﬁ nally recognised the full constitutional 
value of the Charter.100
Whilst these judicial conﬁ rmation and uses testify that any addition to the Preamble is 
not anodine and is followed with practical effects, it remains that this only amendment of 
the preamble since its inception in 1958 does not disrupt the evolutive dynamics of the 
constitutional block. It simply adds one more written source of constitutional norms, 
alongside the others. 
Despite that all projects aiming at signiﬁ cantly amending the Preamble and codifying 
the constitutional case law eventually “failed”, it is nonetheless instructive to review the 
last endeavour, for it highlights well the advantages and drawbacks of the current system, 
and the adverse consequences that could result from touching at a text which has had such a 
fruitful progeny. 
7. The latest attempt at amending the Preamble: highlights and comments
The Veil Committee was asked to reﬂ ect initially on three themes. Two of them are clearly 
inspired by the limitations imposed by the Declaration’s formal conception of equality. 
Should one enable the legislator to better guarantee the equal access of women and men to 
94 Decision No 2008-564 DC GMO of 19 June 2008.
95 Decision No 2005-514 DC Ship Register of 28 April 2005. The Council considered that the 
legislator has not violated the principle of sustainable development of Art. 6 of the Charter. Decision 
No 2008-564 DC GMO of 19 June 2008. It gave the Council the opportunity to censure some 
provisions based on the Charter and the Constitution itself. 
96 Decision No 2009-599 DC Carbon Tax of 29 December 2009, the CC invalidated provisions 
of the ﬁ nance law related to the carbon tax, based on “rupture” of equality regarding exemptions 
provided by the law to industrial and polluting installations covered by a quota scheme, since these 
quotas were free (para 82). The grounds for exemptions were found to be contrary to Arts 2, 3, and 4 
of the Charter (para 79). 
97 Tribunal correctionnel of Orléans, 09/12/2005; but the decision was quashed in appeal.
98 Administrative Tribunal of Chalons-en-Champagne, order of 29 April 2005, No 050082805.
99 CE, 6 April 2006 Ligue pour la Protection des oiseaux (LPO) No 283103, et 19 June 2006 
Association Eaux et Rivières de Bretagne, No 282456.
100 Decision of 3 October 2008 Commune d’Annec, No 297931. 
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responsibilities, outside of the political sphere? Should one make it possible to have new 
integration policies valuing the diversity of French society to favor the effective respect of 
the principle of equality (afﬁ rmative action)? The last one was triggered by scientiﬁ c and 
medical progress. Are there guiding principles on which to based our approach on 
bioethics?
A few more topics were also suggested, which have already receive some constitutional 
recognition in the case law of the CC: the recognition of human dignity, the pluralism of 
means of expression and media; the respect for private life and the protection on personal 
data; and the European anchoring of the Republic.
The Veil Committee’s work was guided by a number of principles. Some of them are 
obvious, such as the respect of the French constitutional heritage or of recent constitutional 
revisions. Wisely, they were also keen to limit the constitutional amendments’ frenzy, and 
considered that the addition of new norms into the Preamble should only occur where these 
were unlikely to “change” in the medium to long term. However, the Committee was also 
determined to suggest amendments to the Preamble only if they had an uncontested “effet 
utile”. They rejected any symbolic addition, and were strongly opposed to any codiﬁ cation 
of the case law. They considered that academia or committee works produced enough 
“descriptive” codiﬁ cations to ensure the visibility of rights, and that with codiﬁ cation came 
the risk of limiting constitutional dynamism. Besides, they identiﬁ ed important technical 
difﬁ culties concerning the scope of such codiﬁ cation. Finally, they also feared that it could 
be perceived as a threat on the constitutional judges’ independence. 
Let me develop on some of the points which the Committee had to examine, and which 
may be relevant to the Hungarian context.
A speciﬁ c reference to a commitment to the European legal order or to international 
and European treaties for the protection of fundamental rights was rejected in the sense as it 
would constitute a pure abandonment of “soveraineté constituante” and would not allow 
for the protection of principles touching on “French constitutional identity” against 
conﬂ icting European norms.101
Relating to positive action beyond gender issues, although the Committee admitted 
that the constitutional acquis did not enable differentiated treatment based on criteria such 
as race, origin and religion, it nonetheless rejected the idea that either Art. 1 be modiﬁ ed, or 
that the Preamble be amended so as to authorize such positive action policies on ethnical or 
racial grounds. No doubt that the Committee was sensitive to the strong anti-communaurism 
movement within the French constitutional doctrine and political movements. However, it 
insisted that the current constitutional texts and case law offered a sufﬁ cient margin a 
maneuver for ambitious positive action policies.102 It allowed for the special treatment of 
persons with special difﬁ culties103  or in dire social situations (for example young people, 
aged workers, unemployed)104 or based on where they live (for example suburds, rural 
areas…). In relation to the collection of racial or ethical data, which was considered not 
compatible with the Constitution105 they considered that the Constitution allowed for the 
gathering of sufﬁ ciently related data (for example geographical origin, feeling of 
101 Decision No 2006/540 DC Copyright Law of 27 July 2006.
102 Veil: op. cit. 57–64.
103 Decision No 86-207 DC Economic and Social Order of 26 June 1986.
104 Decision No 2006-535 DC Equality of Chances of 30 March 2006.
105 Decision No 2007-557 DC Immigration, Integration and Asylum of 15 Nov. 2007.
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belonging…), which could give sufﬁ cient indications as to the composition of the 
population.
Another issue under consideration was the pluralism of the means of expression and 
media. As exposed earlier, the Constitutional Council declared the pluralism of daily 
newspaper as being a constitutional objective, necessary to guarantee the free communication 
of ideas and opinions protected by Art. 11 of the 1789 Declaration. Later on, it extended its 
cope to radio and television and the internet. Under pressure from the Senate, the 
constitutional revision of  23 July 2008 amended the Constitution (but not its Preamble) in 
order to give competence to the legislator (and no longer the executive) to adopt statutes 
determining the rules relating to “freedom, diversity and the independence of the media”.106 
Although it did not give further constitutional protection to this objective, it led the Veil 
Committee to decline examining any amendment to the Preamble which would reafﬁ rm this 
principle. 
Concerning the protection of privacy and personal data, these did not have any textual 
basis in French constitutional documents. However, the constitutional judge had developped 
a rich jurisprudence, exposed earlier. Based on Art. 2 of the 1789 Declaration, it derived a 
right to respect of private life, with the result that it allows the exchange and sharing of 
personal data between public bodies only with individual’s consent and for a purpose of 
constitutionally protected general interest107 or prevents legal legal persons from treating 
datas relating to offences for the purpose of ﬁ ghting against fraud.108 Besides, there exists 
also quite extensive international standards, as well as protective legislation. Because of 
these, the Committee felt that any amendment would be superﬂ uous, in particular as 
international and European treaties provided complementary safeguards. It applied a similar 
reasoning to the guiding principles related to bioethics. 
As for the right (or principle) of human dignity, it considered the notion to be very 
vague and polyphormic; however, it agreed that Art. 1 of the Constitution could be amended 
to include a precisely drafted principle of “equal dignity”. 
Another aspect which transpires across the Committee’s study, although without being 
explicitly mentionned, is the difﬁ culty in amending preambles in a consensual manner, once 
the national urgency and drama which led to a adoption of a new constitution passes. This 
is not peculiar to France, but is noticeable wherever attempts were made to amend national 
constitutional preambles.109
8. Conclusions
Legal transplants are delicate operations. This is even more so in the case of constitutional 
rules and principles, which reﬂ ect not only universal(isable) values, but also norms, values 
and processes which are peculiar to particular states and their peoples. Comparative 
constitutional law thus has its limits when it comes to inspiring constitutional reforms. Yet, 
I hope that this little “tour” of the Preamble of the French Constitution, which highlighted 
106 Art. 4: addition of “Statutes shall guarantee the expression of diverse opinions and the 
equitable participation of political parties and groups in the democratic life of the Nation.” To the 
competence of the legislator in Art. 34, the revision added “freedom, diversity and the independence 
of the media”. 
107 Decision No 93-325 DC Immigration Law of 13 August 1993.
108 Decision No 2004-499 DC Personal Data of 29 July 2004.
109 Orgad: op. cit. 22.
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its “potential” as well as its limits, can contribute to the Hungarian debate on constitutional 
reform. In any case, at the moment, contemporary France and Hungary seems to have in 
common a liking for “gradual” rather than drastic constitutional development. But, if I 
understand well the current Hungarian debate, they may soon depart, for the better or for 
the worst.
